By Tao Wenzhao
On October 14, the 15 members of the United Nations Security
Council unanimously voted in favor of Resolution 1718, which
condemns North Korea's nuclear test, imposes sanctions on North
Korea in certain fields, and demands that North Korea abandon its
nuclear bid and unconditionally return to the six-party negotiating
table.
This is a clear, no-nonsense signal sent by the international
community to North Korea.
In the joint statement produced by the fourth round of six-party
talks in September 2005, North Korea pledged to abandon its attempt
at acquiring nuclear weapons and relinquish its existing nuclear
facilities. The United States, for its part, committed to
guaranteeing North Korea's security. All parties involved also
stated that they would respect North Korea's right to peaceful
nuclear energy and agreed to discuss the question of providing
light-water reactors to North Korea at the appropriate time.
Looking back at the statement now, one cannot but feel all the
more keenly how valuable these pledges were.
Different interpretations of the joint statement arise primarily
from one question: When is North Korea supposed to give up its
pursuit of nuclear weapons?
The United States' interpretation is that North Korea should
immediately provide a list to the participating countries of the
six-party negotiations that illustrates clearly its nuclear-weapon
projects and facilities and set about dismantling them. This
process, according to Washington' calculation, takes three
years.
At the same time, South Korea is supposed to make preparations
for transmitting electricity to North Korea, which also needs three
years. Three years later, North Korea should abandon its nuclear
weapons and facilities and open to inspection. Only after that can
the issue of providing light-water reactors to the North Korea
become the agenda.
All this, however, is Washington's unilateral wish.
North Korea's understanding of the joint statement is that the
question of light-water reactors should be discussed in the next
round of six-party talks so as to demonstrate the sincerity of the
United States in resolving the Korean nuclear issue peacefully.
Indeed, North Korea made the demand as soon as the fifth round of
six-party negotiations began in early November of 2005.
Such a wide difference in understanding of the joint statement,
which is largely a framework in principle, indicates that detailed
rules for its enforcement must be worked out.
Despite the joint statement, North Korea found that its
situation was going from bad to worse.
Under pressure from Washington, for example, the Macao-based
Banco Delta Asia froze the North Korea's account in September 2005,
which dealt a telling economic blow.
One of a very few connections between North Korea and the
outside world, the bank account was a vital financial window
through which aid provided by the international community was
remitted to North Korea. Although the account freeze directly
involves only a US$24 million loss for North Korea, its actual
direct and indirect losses could reach US$2 billion. Coming while
North Korea was already caught in financial straits, the move was
like rubbing salt in its wounds.
North Korea has ever been pushing the United States to stop the
"financial sanctions," saying that it would return to the six-party
talks shortly after this was done. The United States, however,
claimed that the move was "law enforcement," not "financial
sanctions." North Korea pressed for its case repeatedly, but to no
avail.
It was against this backdrop that North Korea conducted a
missile test in July. But the test backfired, with the Daepudong II
missile crashing into the sea 30 seconds after its launch. Barely
three months after the embarrassing missile mishap, North Korea
conducted a nuclear test that has drawn universal condemnation.
The nuke test, viewed in this context, does not necessarily mean
that North Korea has broken with the six-party negotiations
altogether. To this author, the test seems to show that Pyongyang
is trying to strengthen its bargaining position at the negotiating
table. In fact, North Korea stated in the wake of the nuclear test
that it is ready to return to the six-party talks on the condition
that the United States drops the sanctions.
It is no secret that different schools of opinion inside the US
Government contend with each other. The hawks, for example, were
opposed to including "light-water reactors" into the six-party
joint statement in the first place. After the statement was signed,
they insisted that no new concessions be made to North Korea. In
general, the hawks are pessimistic about the peaceful settlement of
the Korean nuclear issue.
The hawkish opinion, however, does not mirror the mainstream of
US policy in this regard. US President George W. Bush, for
instance, stated time and again after the North Korea's nuclear
test that the US Government still considers the six-party talks to
be the best way to resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.
Washington has no other choice but to seek a peaceful means for
resolving the Korean nuclear issue. The United States is bogged
down deep in the quagmire of Iraq, and there seems to be no light
at the end of the tunnel. Moreover, Osama bin Laden and Taliban
leader Mohammed Omar are still at large and terrorist groups
threaten to attack US targets from time to time - to say nothing of
Iran's nuclear bid compounding matters. All these are restraining
factors.
Among other participants in the six-party talks, China, South
Korea and Russia have made it clear that they are opposed to
resolving the Korean nuclear issue by force. The Chinese
Government, while condemning the test, has been appealing for the
parties involved to exercise restraint and keep calm in order to
avoid rash actions that could lead to an escalation of the crisis
and cause the situation to get out of control.
In view of all this, military means can be ruled out in defusing
the crisis.
In the wake of the North Korea's nuclear test, the United States
and Japan submitted their draft resolution to the Security Council,
pressing for sanctions against North Korea. The Chinese side made
suggestions on a revision of the draft, and the Security Council
members had serious discussions about the resolution in the
following days until the formal resolution eventually was
passed.
If one compares the final resolution with the US-Japanese draft,
one finds outstanding differences in three categories.
First, the sanctions become less harsh. The US-Japan draft
includes air and maritime blockades and an arms embargo. In the
formal resolution, the blockade has been stricken from the text and
the arms embargo has been limited to weapons of mass destruction
such as nuclear weapons and missiles.
Second, the US-Japan draft cited the seventh chapter of the
United Nations Charter, which refers to the means to deal with
aggression and acts threatening peace, implying that force could be
used. The final resolution, however, quotes the 41st article in the
seventh chapter, stating that means other than force will be
employed, excluding the possibility of using force.
Third, the resolution also makes it clear that readjustments
would be made in response to the North Korea's compliance with the
resolution, stating that sanctions could be suspended or dropped
depending on future developments. This indicates that the
international community intends to press North Korea to return to
the negotiating table, instead of forcing it into a deadly
corner.
It can be said that the UN resolution conveys clear-cut, firm,
prudent and appropriately toned messages and is expected to
exercise positive influence on the future development of the Korean
nuclear issue.
The author is a researcher with the Institute of American
Studies under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
(China Daily October 18, 2006)
