By Feng Zhaokui
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is finally making his first
visit to the United States today, seven months after taking
office.
Two weeks after taking office in September 2006, Abe made a
whirlwind visit to China and the Republic of Korea. In January, he
emphasized Japan would strengthen its cooperation with NATO during
his visit to several European countries.
His moves are noteworthy since usually a new Japanese prime
minister calls on Washington first.
There have been different interpretations of the timing of Abe's
belated US trip. One is that Abe has full confidence in the
closest-ever relations between Japan and the US forged by his
predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi, and can afford not to rush to
Washington. The other is that despite the Abe administration's
pledge to further strengthen the Japan-US alliance, Abe is
modifying Koizumi's overly pro-US policy and is attempting to
pursue Japan's own self-determined foreign policy.
There have indeed been some unpleasant exchanges between Japan
and the US since Abe took office. To be more specific:
During his trip to Japan in late February, US Vice-President
Dick Cheney refused to meet with Japanese Defense Minister
Fukushiro Nukaga because Nukaga had earlier characterized President
George W. Bush's decision to launch the war in Iraq as a "mistake"
and accused the superpower ally of being arrogant toward Japan over
the issue of US military bases in Japan.
On March 20, Yomiuri Shimbun, the largest daily
newspaper in Japan, unexpectedly questioned the US nuclear umbrella
for Japan. Some officials in the Japanese Defense Ministry said
publicly that Japan needs to know "when under a nuclear attack from
North Korea, how soon the US would retaliate with its own nuclear
arms and how the US would notify Japan" of the counterattack. The
ministry insisted that Japan must know beforehand if the US would
definitely use nuclear arms.
In March, the North American Aerospace Defense Command
unexpectedly published some sensitive data about Japan's two new
spy satellites which were deemed top secret, much to the dismay of
Japanese military and government. Some analysts speculated this
move was the US way to warn Japan against trying to end its
dependency on US intelligence.
That same month, Japan became concerned when the US and North
Korea appeared to be heading for reconciliation at the six-party
talks in Beijing.
The Sankei Shimbun newspaper slammed the US for "making
unbelievable concessions" to North Korea. The Yomiuri
Shimbun went so far as to claim "some people within the
Japanese government have begun to suspect the US and the North
Korea have made some shady deals behind Japan's back."
When the US Congress was to consider a bill demanding that Japan
apologize to victims over the issue of wartime "comfort women", the
Japanese prime minister's office sent two assistants in succession
to Washington in an unsuccessful bid to intercept the bill.
Both the White House and State Department found various excuses
not to hear what the Japanese envoys had to say. The US was also
angered by Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso's negative comment on
the US occupation of Japan after World War II.
When Abe initially denied the Japanese government's
responsibility for "comfort women" in early March it touched off
anger in the international community.
Before Abe's US visit, the Washington Post published an
interview in which the prime minister seemed to soften his position
saying, "I must sincerely express my sympathy to those who had been
victimized during the war as comfort women. As a human being I must
express my sympathy and as the Japanese prime minister I must
apologize to them." His statement was apparently meant to clear the
air before his US trip.
All the above-mentioned episodes suggest the Japan-US ties from
Koizumi's days as prime minister have lost some warmth.
Under the Koizumi administration, the close personal
relationship between the Japanese prime minister and the US
president with their similar strongman stands effectively
suppressed potential friction.
Koizumi was able to visit the North Korea without prior notice
to Washington and the US government did not show its displeasure
publicly.
Also, in July 2006, Bush planned for Koizumi to address a joint
session of Congress. (To date, the only foreign statesman to have
the honor was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill.)
However, because the then Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Chairman Richard G. Lugar demanded that Koizumi cease visiting the
Yasukuni Shrine as a precondition for addressing the Senate and the
House, Koizumi considered canceling the trip.
Bush salvaged the situation by inviting Koizumi to his ranch in
Texas as a sign of personal appreciation. An enthusiastic Koizumi
gave a memorable song and dance performance for his host and other
guests, bringing his honeymoon diplomacy to a spectacular
climax.
Unfortunately, with the Bush administration's dramatic defeat in
the midterm elections last November and Abe facing mounting
problems in domestic politics, it remains to be seen whether the
two heads of state can effectively manage the potential frictions
between Japan and the US.
Nevertheless, Abe's long-held hardline pro-US political
philosophy (which is even stronger than Koizumi's) suggests the
guidelines for continued strengthening of the Japan-US alliance
will not change. At least as important, it does not serve Japan's
national interest to alter the current national strategy.
Abe already made it clear after taking office that he would
continue to strengthen Japan-US ties and the Japanese Diet passed
legislation allowing the Japan Air Self-Defense Force to fly supply
missions in Iraq.
Abe's US visit is apparently aimed at telling his US ally that
Japan is determined to reinforce the bilateral alliance. He also
needs to exchange ideas with Washington after the recent
improvement in Japan-China relations. He is expected to emphasize
that Japan will develop its ties with China against the background
of the continuing Japan-US alliance and that better relations with
China will not lead to the "emptying" of the Japan-US alliance.
But Abe also needs to closely follow US political developments
in the next year or two to tailor his US policy to new directions
in US domestic politics. Japanese media have speculated that Abe's
short visit to the US is unlikely to achieve tangible results.
It should also be pointed out that, after decades of continued
strengthening and institutionalization of the Japan-US alliance,
both countries have penetrated deeply into each other's domestic
politics (especially the US political penetration of Japan) and
nurtured a large number of elites whose careers and futures are
linked to the bilateral alliance.
The human network formed by such penetration remains a force in
maintaining the Japan-US alliance.
The author is former deputy director of the Institute of
Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences.
(China Daily April 26, 2007)
